The report undoes once and for all Greensboro’s cherished mythology that the shootings were the sole responsibility of two extremist groups who came from somewhere else to perpetrate violence in the streets of an innocent and disinterested city...
...We own this thing.
The 1979 Klan-Nazi killings are a part of Greensboro's history. We are unlikely to achieve consensus as to what they meant, and what they mean now, any more than we have consensus about other events in our past. I think the report makes a mistake by viewing things too often through the political lens of the CWP survivors. But we can reconcile ourselves to some basic truths that run counter to the story we've told ourselves for a quarter-century, and the report is a valuable step in that direction.
A flawed but useful TRC report
by Edward Cone
News & Record
6-4-06
The report of the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission is a flawed but highly valuable document. It does not deliver the final word in this city's long-running debate over the Klan/Nazi killings of November 3, 1979, and it is often credulous and politically biased, but it does reframe the conversation in some important ways.
The report undoes once and for all Greensboro's cherished mythology that the shootings were the sole responsibility of two extremist groups who came from somewhere else to perpetrate violence in the streets of an innocent and disinterested city.
Yes, there were two extremist groups at Morningside Homes that morning, and the TRC –- contrary to the expectations of some critics -- does a reasonably good job of acknowledging the responsibility of the Communist Workers Party for its part in inviting the disaster that befell it (the nature and culpability of the Klan and Nazis have never really been in doubt).
But the report illuminates the ineluctable truth that there was a third party in play that day that must be seen as central to the story: the Greensboro Police Department, which failed to keep the peace despite extensive intelligence as to the nature of the two groups, the hostile relationship between them, and their activities in the run-up to the shootings. "The GPD showed a stunning lack of curiosity in planning for the safety of the event," says the commission, and it backs up that assertion with a litany of facts.
The central role of our police force helps to bring home another truth that Greensboro has tried to avoid for more than a quarter-century: we own this thing. It is a part of our history. The killings took place in a Greensboro neighborhood, and many of the principals lived and worked here; those who traveled to get here did not travel far. The report is full of familiar names and locations, of context and history and place, and the place is Greensboro.
None of this is news to people who have followed the story carefully and with an open mind. The role of the police, for example, was made clear in the 1985 civil suit that found in which the City of Greensboro paid a judgment liable for the wrongful death of one of the marchers. But to have it all summed up in a single document is a powerful thing. And make no mistake: this report will be read for years to come. It will pop up high in Google searches and find its way into libraries and onto conference agendas.
And that makes its flaws all the more frustrating.
One of the report's great failings is that it tries so hard to empathize with the slain and their survivors that it goes beyond explanation into apologetics. This comes through in the choice of particular words, and in the structure and emphasis of the document as a whole.
For example, the report says members of the Communist Workers Party bear responsibility for their rhetoric and actions in challenging the Klan, but then gives these educated people, who had faced off with the Klan once before and seen bloodshed as activists and labor organizers, something of a pass for being "very naïve about the level of danger posed by their rhetoric and the Klan’s propensity for violence." The commissioners criticize the decision by the march organizers "to undertake this highly risky strategy in a marginalized poor neighborhood," but then allow for a possible "benevolent spirit" behind that choice.
In the same vein, the report makes it clear that the CWP (previously known as the Workers Viewpoint Organization) was less interested in building unions than in fomenting revolution, and that it had limited success in organizing workers. "The WVO's aggressive tactics and hard-line communist ideology made it difficult to collaborate with other groups working to unionize the workers and may have kept supporters away," say the commissioners. "Jim Waller [a leader of the group who was killed on 11/3/79] was direct about the WVO’s interest in unions: 'We will struggle against any tendency to raise building this union as the principal goal, to elevate it above building the Party to prepare for revolution.'"
Why, then, does the report devote almost 100 pages to a left-leaning history of the labor movement in the textile industry? The commissioners seem incapable of following their own narrative. They reveal the CWP as a radical group with an agenda separate from the labor movement, but then fall right back into the CWP's own cover story. The report commends the CWP for speaking out "against racist violence, poverty and unfair labor practices." Speaking out against those bad things is laudable, but that was not all that the CWP was doing. This lack of moral clarity about ends and means crops up frequently in the report, including a near-seamless conflation of non-violent protests like the Greensboro Sit-ins with later, more radical movements.
Also troubling is the statement endorsed by a majority of commissioners that "the single most important element that contributed to the violent outcome of the confrontation was the absence of police." Commissioner Bob Peters, the only attorney in the group, couldn’t bring himself to sign off on that one. As he noted in a concurring opinion, "the main wrongdoing must lie with the Nazi/Klan due to their violent hate language and their use of excessive force in the deaths."
The report provides important context as it examines the two criminal trials that failed to convict anyone for the killings, and the unsatisfying response of the City in the wake of the shootings. It also includes several recommendations for future action, aimed at the reconciliation part of its mandate. Some are good ideas, like a formal recognition by the City of the importance of November 3, 1979, and calls for understanding and dialogue across different parts of the community. Some may be good ideas, or not, but seem far afield in any case from the mission of the TRC, such as a push for a "living wage" scale for local public employees. And some, like the formation of a police review board with subpoena powers, revisit long-simmering questions about the way we should run our city.
I wish the commissioners had spent more time humanizing the five people killed in our streets – the accounts of their deaths are horrifying and moving, but we don’t really get to know them as individuals – and less time arguing from a political point of view. The weaknesses in the volume will make it easier for people who want to preserve the mythology and ignore the history to write the whole thing off.
Writing it all off, though, would be a mistake. The report contains some powerful and important truths, and even some of its less-successful chapters add depth and perspective to the history of Greensboro. The comprehensive story of November 3, 1979 and its aftermath remains to be written. This report would be a useful resource in any such an effort, but it does not fulfill the need on its own.
There is plenty of truth in the report, and plenty of opinion as well. Whether it helps Greensboro toward reconciliation is now up to us.
Copyright © 2006 - The News & Record
Edward Cone (www.edcone.com, [email protected]) writes a column for the News & Record most Sundays.
Thank you for your column. It appears that we read at least one important conclusion differently. Given the documentation in the GTRC report of the WVO members’ contribution to the welfare of NC residents, especially minorities, poor and/or workers in the region’s textile mills, it is clear that the group had a strong connection to labor issues. To discount this connection just because their primary goal was party organizing is like dismissing Republicans or Democrats as nothing but party hacks just because party organizing is their primary aim. I don’t think anyone disputes that either party is concerned with public policy, just as no-one can disagree that both parties’ main objective is to see their candidates win.
It is vital to understand the ‘causes’ that the WVO was pursuing in order to understand why they were so intent on their party overcoming. Likewise, it is important to understand the social/political background of the Klan and Nazis to understand their motives. And the difference in 'motives' is a fundamental difference in the 'threat' the two groups pose(d) to society.
Posted by: art | Jun 04, 2006 at 02:09 PM
The Dems and GOP aren't party-building to foment violent revolution. Seems a distinction worth making.
I saw a lot more rhetoric than accomplishment documented in the report. Problems are identified, but few real results are shown. And giving the WVO/CWP credit for some good intentions does not justify their actions.
Also, it largely ignores the good intentions of others who approached the same issues differently.
Many people and groups worked and continue to work for social welfare and justice without violent rhetoric or endangering innocents. MLK Jr. and the kids killed in Mississippi worked for non-violent change and paid the ultimate price. For that matter the Cone family gave the community a hospital that treats the indigent regardless of their ability to pay.
To read the report, though, you'd think it was a lone band of truth-seekers versus the rest of the world. Theories of non-violent social change just morph into radicalism, and that's presented as a natural evolution rather than a tragic mistake. An era of vast social change -- too slow, too uneven, to be sure -- is portrayed as a time of stasis or reaction.
I have no problem with a history that gives the CWP version of the story, although I may disagree with some of it. For a report that is supposed to present truth and foster reconciliation, though, the perspective seems woefully limited and skewed.
Posted by: Ed Cone | Jun 04, 2006 at 02:57 PM
Ed, regarding this paragraph:
"Also troubling is the statement endorsed by a majority of commissioners that "the single most important element that contributed to the violent outcome of the confrontation was the absence of police." Commissioner Bob Peters, the only attorney in the group, couldn’t bring himself to sign off on that one. As he noted in a concurring opinion, "the main wrongdoing must lie with the Nazi/Klan due to their violent hate language and their use of excessive force in the deaths."...
There's a clear distinction here: the single most important contributing factor that led to the event turning violent (police absence), and the heaviest burden of responsibility/wrongdoing(Klan/Nazis). The report and Bob Peters are in agreement.
page 38 of the Report:
"While we believe the highest responsibility for bringing about the confrontation lies with those Klansmen and Nazis who went to the parade intending to provoke a fight and ultimately opened fire on the demonstrators, the GTRC also believes that the deaths could have been prevented with visible police presence."
Since this is the second time you've mentioned it, I thought it worth noting. Did you speak with Bob Peters for some clarification? You said last time you found it "confusing."
Posted by: Chewie | Jun 05, 2006 at 06:14 PM
The disconnect between Peters and the other commissioners is there -- although I wish that the TRC, which refers frequently to the opinion of "a majority" of commissioners without telling us about the dissenting opinions, and which buries Peters' opinion in a hard-to-find place away from the main report -- was more forthcoming about it.
The report says "the majority of commissioners find the single most important element that contributed to the violent outcome of the confrontation was the absence of police." (my emphasis)
Peters says he has "a perspective that differs in some respects from that of the majority of the Commissioners," and says in his discussion of reponsbility.: "Much fault must also lie with the police."
Not "most," but "much." Two different points of view.
Posted by: Ed Cone | Jun 05, 2006 at 06:48 PM
I dunno. The rationale I suggested seems more germane and more direct. Seems like you're stretching Peters' words a bit.
But, I'm content to say the language leaves some interpretation open to readers, such as the use of "majority" instead of naming names or numbers. I think that is probably by design, as they stated they were making decisions by consensus.
All the Commissioners' reflections were found in the same location, so it also seems unfair to suggest that they "buried" Peters' opinion -- if, by that, the majority of the Cone commission means to suggest intentionality.
Posted by: Chewie | Jun 05, 2006 at 07:32 PM
Where's the stretch? The report cites a "majority" for the finding of "most" fault; Peters says he disagrees in some places with the majority, and makes a specific point of articulating a different apportionment of fault.
As for the location of Peters' opinion, it is unique among the commissioners' reflections in that it involves a substantive discussion of material in the report, and in fact includes divergences from the report's majority conclusions. It is buried amidst the persona reflections -- may of which are interesting and worth reading, but none of which are divergent views by the group's only attorney.
Posted by: Ed Cone | Jun 05, 2006 at 08:14 PM
HEY CAN U TELL ME ABOUT GLOBEL WARMINH
Posted by: numn | Nov 30, 2006 at 11:33 PM